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POLICY MAKERS
THE GROWTH OF SMALLHOLDER 
MAIZE PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE 
(1979-1985): IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FOOD SECURITY
D.D. Rohrbach*
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, over 40% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa suffered from 
calorie deficiencies, as indicated by consumption levels below 90% of 
FAO/WHO requirements. Consumption levels below 80% of FAO/WHO 
requirements threatened one-quarter of all Africans with stunted growth and 
serious health problems^ (World Bank, 1986:17). Yet per capita food 
production further declined in two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan countries over 
the next five years (FAO, 1985a). African cereal grain imports increased 
to record levels (FAO, 1985b). By 1987, three-quarters of the countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa required concessionary food aid. In the SADCC region, 
every country except Zimbabwe required net food imports (USDA, 1987).
Zimbabwe’s recent cereal production record stands in sharp contrast to 
these African trends. Between 1979 and 1985, Zimbabwe registered an 80% 
increase in per capita cereal production^. Production of maize, the country’s 
basic staple which provides 70% of the cereal calories and 45% of all calories 
in the average Zimbabwe diet (FAO, 1984), more than doubled. By the end 
of 1986, Zimbabwe had amassed a record maize stock of almost 2 million 
mt--20% larger than the previous year’s total domestic maize consumption. 
Although Zimbabwe initiated a large domestic food aid programme in 
response to widespread drought during the 1986-87 season, the country could 
(till export 500,000 mt of maize to other countries in the region.
^Visiting Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics and 
iExtension, University of Zimbabwe, August 1985 - March 1987.
^CSO (1985a) and CSO (1986b) provide two basic listings of Zimbabwe 
^cultural statistics employed herein.
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Remarkably, smallholders contributed most of Zimbabwe’s post-1979 maize 
production gains (Figure 1)^. During the 1970’s, smallholder crop production 
was broadly characterized by low productivity and slow growth. Maize prod­
uction, the smallholder sector’s principal farm enterprise, was stagnant. 
Yields averaged one-seventh those obtained by the commercial farm sector 
(Figure 2). While planting two-thirds of the country’s maize area, smallhold­
ers harvested only one-quarter of the total maize crop (Figure 3). Small­
holder maize sales accounted for less than 5% of total deliveries to national 
markets (Figure 4). These farmers made up 95% of the producers, yet earn­
ed less than 10% of the agricultural income derived from crop and livestock 
sales through the marketing authorities (CSO, 1986b).
During the six years from 1979 to 1985, the smallholder maize subsector 
rapidly expanded. Maize production more than tripled as area increased by 
90% and yields roughly doubled. By 1985, smallholders produced over one- 
half the country’s maize supply. Sixty percent of the production gains were 
delivered to national markets. As a result, the smallholder contribution to 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB) intake rose to over one-third of total maize 
deliveries. These successes led the government to project a 7% annual 
growth rate in smallholder harvests over the 1986 to 1990 period (Zimbabwe 
Government, 1986).
This paper identifies why smallholder maize production and market sales 
increased so rapidly after 1979 and examines the implications of these gains 
for national food security (see Rohrbach 1987, 1988 for more details). The 
analysis is based on a review of aggregate smallholder production and market 
data and 13 months of farm-level survey work in two smallholder farming 
regions. One survey region, Mangwende, situated in Mashonaland East Prov­
ince, was chosen to represent Zimbabwe’s high-potential farming regions. 
The second region, Chibi, in Masvingo Province, was chosen to represent a 
maize producing region in the low-potential farming regions.
This paper first reviews the major factors underlying the smallholder 
maize production and market gains. Second, the relative response of small­
holders to price, institutional, and technological interventions is assessed.
-*In 1983, Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector encompassed roughly 5,500 
large-scale commercial farmers, 8,600 small-scale commercial farmers, and 
800,000 communal or smallholder farmers (CSO, 1985a). By 1986, the nascent 
resettlement areas held approximately 31,600 farmers (MFEDP, 1986). Over 
90% of Zimbabwe’s maize is produced by large-scale commercial and com­
munal farmers.
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Third, the breadth of participation in the smallholder production and sales 
trends is examined and the principal characteristics distinguishing major par­
ticipants are cited. Fourth, the constraints and opportunities for replicating 
these gains across alternative smallholder crops and across countries in the 
SADCC region are briefly noted. The discussion concludes with a comment 
on the implications of the growth in smallholder production for Zimbabwe’s 
food security.
CAUSES OF SMALLHOLDER MAIZE 
PRODUCTION GROWTH
The growth of smallholder maize production between 1979 and 1985 can be 
largely attributed to five factors: the ending of the independence war, the 
expansion of product and input market infrastructure, the availability of a 
proven set of maize technologies, the establishment of a smallholder credit 
programme, and the sharp 1980 and 1981 increase in maize producer prices.
The ending of the war
The independence struggle in Zimbabwe widely disrupted smallholder agricul­
ture, particularly during the mid-to-late 1970s. As violence in the rural 
areas escalated, agricultural support institutions provided to smallholders 
were destroyed or abandoned. Extension workers were withdrawn, dip tanks 
were razed, and isolated government buildings were demolished. More im­
portantly, communal farmers abandoned distant fields, fewer new holdings 
were created, and many farmers left their holdings altogether. After inde­
pendence, the government estimated up to one-third of the smallholder sec­
tor required resettlement. While survey data indicate this figure may be 
high, a substantial loss of production likely occurred. Aggregate estimates 
of communal production during this period do not fully reflect this loss, pos­
sibly because the extension workers responsible for making these estimates 
were withdrawn from many areas.
At the end of the war, the area in smallholder maize increased sharply. 
This resulted from both a sudden increase in the number of smallholder 
farmers and an expansion of the area planted by those who had continued 
farming during the war. Survey evidence from Mangwende and Chibi reveals 
many younger families took advantage of the peace to establish new hold­
ings. Older households replanted abandoned fields and further expanded 
their holdings (Table 1). The area of all major crops, except bulrush millet, 
increased, but the largest gains occurred in maize area.
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Expansion of market infrastructure
After independence, the limited input and product market infrastructure 
serving the smallholder sector rapidly expanded. Many shopkeepers in the 
communal areas began stocking seed, fertilizer, insecticide, and farm equip­
ment. Stores based in urban centres established rural outlets. The fertiliser 
and agrochemical companies began promoting agricultural inputs with village 
based sales and demonstration trials. The growth of input markets was par­
ticularly strong in high-potential regions such as Mangwende.
The GMB was established in 1931 with sole responsibility for buying all 
major grain and oilseed crops sold beyond district borders. Until 1980, this 
institution concentrated its activities in the large farm sector. Thereafter, 
the GMB invested heavily in establishing depots and collection points in the 
smallholder farming areas (Table 2). Concurrently, private sector investors 
established GMB authorised approved buyer facilities and farm-to-market 
transport operations. Small shopkeepers registered with the GMB to pur­
chase crops and smallholders, themselves, bought lorries. In Mangwende, 
for example, a GMB depot had been established in 1977, but the first ap­
proved buyer serving survey farmers set up operations in 1982. A series of 
collection points were established by the GMB in 1985. The dumber of lo­
cally based transporters serving survey respondents increased from two in 
1980 to 18 in 1985. In Chibi, two GMB collection points were established in 
1985. An approved buyer started operations in 1986. However, crop sales 
were insufficient to stimulate the establishment of locally based transport 
services.
The expansion of input markets reduced the cost of input transport and 
increased input availability. The expansion of product market facilities re­
duced farm-to-market transport costs, thus raising farm level prices. To­
gether, these interventions increased the net returns to maize production 
and the incentive of producers to expand their maize hectarage. Greater 
quantities of inputs were purchased and many smallholder began selling maize 
on the national market for the fust time. For example, the proportion of 
Mangwende farmers selling maize to the GMB increased from 22% in 1980 to 
80% in 1985. In Chibi, 85% of the farmers selling crops to the GMB, made 
such sales for the first time 1985.
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Table 1. Sources o f increase in maize area in Mangwende and 
Chibi, 1974-1975 to 1985-86, Zimbabwe.
Mangwende Chibi
Proportion of maize 
area gain resulting from:
1975-1981 1981-86 1975-81 1981-86
Increase in number of 
farmers (%) 71 40 86 69
Increase in area per 
existing farmer (%) 29 60 14 31
Source: Mangwende and Chibi survey.
Table 2. Expansion of GMB buying points, 1975-86, Zimbabwe.
1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total depots 32 34 37 41 43 44 45 51
Communal depots 1 3 6 10 12 13 14 20
Collection points 0 0 0 0 0 0 135 57
Source: GMB
314
The availability o f improved technology
While the expansion of market infrastructure improved the economic returns 
to all major smallholder crops, only maize production increased significantly^. 
The historical development of improved maize production technologies gave 
this crop a competitive advantage over alternative smallholder enterprises. 
Before 1980, most agricultural research had been geared to the needs of the 
large-scale commercial sector. Yet, some results were also applicable to 
smallholders. Decades of breeding research produced hybrids adapted broadly 
to high and low-potential zones. Fertilizer trials provided recommendations 
roughly attuned to the agroecological conditions of the small farm sector, 
particularly the higher-rainfall regions.
Between 1979 and 1985, hybrid maize seed sales to the smallholder sector 
increased roughly fivefold (Table 3). By 1986, roughly 85% of the smallhold­
er maize area was planted with hybrid seed. Smallholders increased their 
fertilizer purchases for maize by 400% (Table 3). Much of the sharp 
increase in 1980 input sales resulted from the distribution of free inputs 
under a one-year refugee resettlement programme. Thereafter, most of the 
sales gain can be attributed to the expansion of input market infrastructure, 
improved maize returns, and the establishment of a smallholder credit pro­
gramme.
The establishment of a smallholder credit programme
Smallholders first gained access to government agricultural credit in 1958, 
although less than 1% of these farmers received loans. By 1962 only 4,000 
short-term loans had been granted, most to small-scale commercial farmers 
(Johnson, 1964). In 1978, The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), his­
torically a major lending body for large-scale commercial farmers, established 
a major new small-farm credit programme. By 1985, roughly 10% of small­
holders received loans. In the two survey regions covered by this investiga­
tion, credit provided the principal basis for fertilizer investments. In 
Mangwende almost three-quarters of all fertilizer purchased in 1986-87 was 
bought with credit, though only 37 of the region’s farmers received loans. 
In Chibi, the 5% of the farmers receiving credit purchased almost 90% of the 
fertilizer applied. In both regions, all loans were granted for maize.
^Smallholder cotton production also increased sharply, though the in­
crease in maize area was five times greater than that to cotton.
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Tabic 3. Hybrid maize seed and fertilizer deliveries to the 
smallholder sector, 1974-85, Zimbabwe.
Cropping Fertilizer Deliveries Seed Deliveries
Season (mt) (mt)
1974/75 24,000 2,350
1975/76 19,000 3,950
1976/77 20,000 2,700
1977/78 25,000 3,700
1978/79 25,000 4,250
1979/80 27,000 4,300
1980/81 90,000 9,650
1981/82 96,000 13,950
1982/83 98,000 16,900
1983/84 106,000 17,300
1984/85 127,664 19,500
1985/86 130,000 (est) 20,250 (est)
Source: Windmill (1987); Seed Cooperative (1987)
Producer prices
Belwcen 1979 and 1981, the government increased the real producer price of 
maize by 80% (Figure 5). The ratio of the producer price to the price of 
maize fertilizer increased 50% (Figure 6). Maize producer prices doubled 
relative to consumer prices (Figure 6). After 1981, the real maize price and 
produccr-to-consumer price ratio sharply declined. The maize-to-fertilizer 
price ratio fell more gradually.
Commercial farmers quickly responded to these price changes. Between 
1979 and 1981, the commercial maize area increased by 50%; commercial pro­
duction more than doubled. When real maize prices began to decline, com­
mercial production similarly fell. Between 1981 and 1985, commercial maize 
area and production declined by 30%. In contrast, smallholder maize produc­
tion and sales rose throughout the post-war period. Between 1981 and 1985, 
when real maize prices were falling, smallholder production increased by 60%.
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Smallholder maize sales more than doubled. In both Mangwende and Chibi, 
the largest increase in market deliveries occurred after 1981. During this 
period, the expansion in smallholder access to national markets, improved 
availability of inputs, and growth of agricultural credit offset the impact of 
the decline in administered prices.
The 1979 to 1981 price gains provided a post-war stimulus to smallholder 
production. In high-rainfall Mangwende, these gains helped prompt the ex­
pansion of market infrastructure and promoted greater use of improved tech­
nologies. Yet, infrastructural and institutional changes may, ultimately, have 
had a much larger impact on producer decision making than the level of ad­
ministered prices. Before 1980, smallholders remained largely unresponsive to 
input prices and fluctuations in government guaranteed producer prices. The 
post-war sales trends in the two survey regions are most closely correlated 
with the expansion in each area’s market infrastructure.
PRICE INCENTIVES, TECHNICAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Theoretical models of supply response emphasize the importance of either 
price policy and market liberalization, or structural change encompassing the 
expansion of market infrastructure and improved technology. The World 
Bank stands prominently as a major advocate of price and market reforms. 
In a 1984 strategy statement for Africa, the Bank cited price distortions and 
market inefficiency as the major constraints to agricultural production 
(World Bank, 1984). The Bank argued for removing administrative controls 
on input and product prices, encouraging greater private sector involvement 
in agricultural markets, and the more "businesslike" operation of parastatals. 
These prescriptions assume the short-run elasticity of aggregate agricultural 
production is high and technological and infrastructural constraints are not 
immediately limiting.
Advocates of institutional and technological change (eg., Eicher, 1982, 
1986; Delgado and Mellor, 1984) argue that aggregate supply is relatively 
inelastic. This perspective emphasizes the constraints embodied in limited 
market infrastructure, the lack of improved location-specific technology, low 
levels of human capital, and poor institutional management. Adjustments in 
producer prices will not substantially affect production levels without the 
removal of these constraints. Relative prices are still viewed as important. 
However, the effectiveness of price incentives depends on their incidence at 
the farm level and the capacity of farmers to respond. Without institutional 
and technological reforms, the impact of price policy will be limited. How­
ever, institutional and technological reforms on their own can have a poten­
tially large impact on smallholder production.
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Zimbabwe gained independence with a relatively efficient set of market 
institutions. Maize prices had historically fluctuated between import and 
export parity. GMB storage losses were less than 1%. The large-scale com­
mercial sector’s response to market incentives was strong. In contrast, the 
responsiveness of small farmers was strikingly weak. The principal reason 
for this disparity was the concentration of most public sector support in 
favor of large farmers. Credit, research, and market institutions had largely 
been built to serve the commercial sector. Major increases in smallholder 
productivity did not occur until the early 1980s when these institutions and 
infrastructure were expanded to serve small farmers.
Before 1980, the main smallholder cropping strategy was to produce 
enough food for family consumption while seeking off-farm employment for 
cash income. Some farmers adopted improved technologies such as hybrid 
seed and fertilizer to increase their labour productivity and food supplies. 
However, they did not invest extensively to produce a maize surplus. Over 
the 1980 to 1985 period, the smallholder’s strategy changed. Following the 
war, the producer price increase and refugee relief programmes stimulated 
greater interest in participation in the national market. Yet, longer term 
production gains can be primarily attributed to infrastructural and institu­
tional improvements. These fostered continuing increases in maize produc­
tion when the refugee relief programmes had ended and real producer prices 
had declined.
The largest increases in production occurred in regions where location- 
specific maize production technologies yielded the highest returns. While 
higher producer prices and the expansion of market infrastructure improved 
farm-level prices of most smallholder crops, the largest increases in area and 
input investment occurred in maize; the crop for which profitable new tech­
nologies were readily available. In effect, producer prices offered a neces­
sary, though insufficient means to promote smallholder maize production. 
Institutional and technological changes were required to make the producer 
price adjustments effective.
The post-1980 decline in world maize prices now limits Zimbabwe’s ability 
to export grain. The smallholder maize production experience shows that 
further growth in market deliveries can be stimulated through a variety of 
non-price interventions. If real prices continue declining, smallholders will 
still expand their maize production—if provided with additional improvements 
in production technologies, reductions in transport costs, and improved mar­
ket access.
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DISTRIBUTION OF SMALLHOLDER 
PRODUCTION GAINS
Data showing the provincial distribution of smallholder maize plantings indi­
cate that small farmers throughout the country have participated in the ex­
pansion of maize production—the principal crop grown by roughly 80% of 
Zimbabwe’s smallholders. Extension workers have estimated that maize area 
gains were registered in every province. These were distributed roughly 
according to population levels, except in Matabeleland which experienced 
smaller gains.
Differential levels of participation become evident in the examination of 
provincial data for maize yields. While yields have increased throughout the 
country, the larged gains occurred in the higher-rainfall zones. This dif­
ference resulted, in part, because the improved maize technologies (particu­
larly fertilizer) were better suited to the higher-rainfall zones. In addition, 
the survey data reveals a large disparity in institutional support for the high 
and low-rainfall reg ons.
The first GMB depot was established in Mangwende in 1977. By 1985, 
Mangwende survey respondents had gained three approved buyers, a collec­
tion point, and a rjpidly expanding transport system. Two cooperatives pur­
chased crops between 1981 and 1984, but found they could not compete with 
the services provided by other buyers. Market operations were relatively 
efficient. By 1986, 67% of the larmers had participated in AFC credit pro­
grammes and 60% had received help from extension agents. Survey farmers 
could purchase fertilizer from at least five local suppliers and from sales 
agents of fertilizer companies.
By contrast, Chibi farmers did not have a locally based GMB depot. In 
1985, the GMB established two collection points in the region. However, 
there are still no locally based truckers. By 1986, only 5% of farmers had 
received credit and only 27% received extension assistance. Only one local 
retail outlet stocked fertilizer. The differential level and evolution of in­
stitutional support in Mangwende and Chibi reinforced initial differences in 
agroecological potential.
The advantages of high-potential zones are reflected in the regional dis­
tribution of growth in maize sales. The one-quarter of the smallholder pop­
ulation based in hig.h-rainfall regions (Natural Region II) accounts for almost 
60% of smallholder maize sales when rains are good throughout the country 
(e.g., 1984-85). When rains arc poor (e.g., 1983-84), these farmers account 
for over 80% of smallholder maize sales.
The survey data reveal that the concentration of maize production and 
sales within each agroecological zone is as large, if not larger, than that 
between the diffcreit regions. In both Mangwende and Chibi, the top 20%
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of producers harvest at least 50% of each region’s maize and market at least 
55% of all maize sold (Tables 4 and 5). The bottom 40% of Mangwende and 
Chibi farmers harvest 6-12% of each region’s maize. Despite favorable rain­
fall in Mangwende, 12-24% of these farmers are net maize purchasers.^ In 
Chibi, 24% of households are net maize purchasers in good years and 60% 
stated their need to purchase maize following the 1985-86 drought-affected 
season.
The combination of aggregate and regional survey information provides a 
basis for estimating the distribution of maize production and sales across the 
smallholder sector. The data suggest the top 10% of smallholder producers, 
concentrated in the nation’s high-potential zones, are responsible for over 
50% of smallholder maize production anc three-quarters of smallholder maize 
sales. The concentration of production and sales increases in drought years.
These observations indicate that producers facing the smallest food secur­
ity risks are the greatest beneficiaries of government policy changes and 
infrastructural investments designed to promote smallholder production. Pro­
ducers facing frequent or consistent production shortfalls have benefited 
least. The majority of smallholders still face basic food security constraints. 
To improve the circumstances of these poorer producers, the government 
must target future assistance strategies toward ‘resolving the unique 
constraints facing these farmers.
SMALLHOLDER INVESTMENT PRIORITIES
The reason for the disparity between the top 20% and bottom 40% of produ­
cers in each region merits further investigation. Several relationships in the 
Mangwende and Chibi data suggest these differences are not simply the re­
sult of a concentration of resource ownership. Rather, the most productive 
farmers in each region have explicitly decided to make greater investments 
in the maize enterprise.
As the war ended, smallholders throughout Zimbabwe expanded their 
maize area. Many of the largest producers in 1985 had expanded their 
plantings the most. Part of this gain resulted from reclaiming fields aban­
doned during the war. These farmers also sought additional allocations from 
lands previously designated as grazing areas (land in the smallholder farming 
areas is allocated by regional chiefs, ward councilors, and village headmen).
The better farmers in both Mangwende and Chibi also took greater ad­
vantage of the expansion of input markets, and particularly, the availability
^The lower figure corresponds wi h the exceptionally good 1984-85 
season. The higher figure corresponds with the average 1985-86 season.
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Table 4. D istribution o f m aize production in M angwende and Chibi, 
1984-85 and 1965-86 seasons, Zimbabwe
Proportion o f total maize harvest (%)
Mangwende Chibi
Quintile 1984-5 1985-6 1984-5 1985-6
Top 54 49 54 67
Second 19 21 21 17
Third 15 20 14 9
Fourth 9 7 8 5
Bottom 3 2 4 1
Source: Mangwende and Chibi surveys.
T ableS. D istribution a t m aize sales in M angwende and Chibi, 
1984-85 and 1985-86 cropping seasons, Zimbabwe.
Proportion of total maize sales (%)
Mangwende Chibia
Quintile 1985 1986 1985 1986
Top 54 59 84 100
Second 24 26 15 0
Third 14 12 1 0
Fourth 7 3 0 0
Bottom 0 0 0 0
aDrought occurred in Chibi during the 1985-86 season. 
Source: Mangwende and Chibi Surveys
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of agricultural credit. In Mangwende, loans have been made available to 
two-thirds of the region’s farmers. Yet over the 1984-85 to 1986-87 period, 
the number of recipients declined. Only 20% of these farmers consistently 
accepted loans during this period. While some recipients were forced to 
dropout of the loan programme due to repayment difficulties, others simply 
declined to accept more credit. Almost 60% of the households which have 
continued to participate in the loan programme are headed by men who pri­
marily live and work elsewhere. Despite this, these farmers are among 
Mangwende’s top producers. In Chibi, only farmers with the most land in 
maize have taken agricultural lbans. However, this bias may reflect the 
tendency of credit-granting AFC agents to consider these producers as the 
best loan risks.
The average Mangwende and Chibi household earns 20-40% of its income 
from sources other than field crop production, excluding vegetable crops. 
Forty-four percent of the male household heads in Mangwende and one-third 
of those in Chibi work off-farm. Yet most of this income is not getting re­
invested into crop production, and much of the income earned from crop 
sales is invested elsewhere. The largest single investment expenditure of 
most households is school fees. Yet many farmers are also investing in a 
broad range of consumption items and alternative enterprises including beer, 
clothes, improved housing, record players, sewing machines, retail shops, and 
lorries. While most smallholder households face severe resource constraints, 
greater cash, labour and land resources were rapidly and broadly committed 
to maize after 1979. The survey evidence indicates that some fanners simply 
decided to make greater investments in enterprises other than crop produc­
tion.
REPLICABILITY OF THE MAIZE PRODUCTION GAINS
A key constraint on the replication of Zimbabwe’s maize production gains 
across a broader range of crops is the lack of improved, location-specific 
technologies. Smallholders have proven their willingness to adopt improved 
technologies if these are perceived as profitable. The adoption pattern of 
maize recommendations suggests smallholders have discriminated between 
technologies yielding higher returns and those offering questionable gains. 
Hybrid seed has proven its profitability in high and low-rainfall zones. Fer­
tilizer has proven its effectiveness in higher-rainfall regions, though only a 
small number of farmers are beginning to accept the risks of fertilizer ap­
plication in low-rainfall zones. Credit recipients have tested insecticide and 
found the returns to this investment do not justify even the limited cost. 
In Mangwende and Chibi, farmers only purchase insecticide for maize as re-
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quircd in loan packages. Similarly, Mangwende farmers have tested herbicide 
in agrochemical company demonstration trials and rejected this technology.
Farmers in Mangwende and Chibi have consistently rejected recommended 
technologies for sorghum, millet, and groundnuts. Without technological im­
provements, smallholders will continue to produce these crops primarily for 
home consumption. Following the incidence of mid season dry spells and 
drought during four of the first six cropping seasons following independence, 
extension workers have encouraged farmers in Chibi to reduce their mai/.c 
production and plant more drought-tolerant crops such as sorghum and mil­
let. Yet, despite the likelihood of drought, Chibi farmers perceive the re­
turns to maize production to be higher than the returns to the recommended 
alternatives. While they still plant sorghum and millets, acknowledging their 
relative drought tolerance, maize remains the preferred food and cash enter­
prise. Until the yields of these alternative crops can be increased, maize 
will continue to dominate these cropping patterns.
The implications of the maize production and market gains for other 
countries in the region depend on each nation’s farming circumstances. Sev­
eral factors make the Zimbabwe situation unique. Much of the increase in 
production, particularly that associated with area gains, resulted from the 
ending of the war. The resolution of rural instability and violence stimu­
lated a return of refugees to farming, reclamation of fields once abandoned, 
and expansion of holdings. Second, the new Zimbabwe government initiated 
a well developed set of agricultural institutions which could be readily ex­
panded to better serve the smallholder. Discrimination against communal 
agriculture in the past had limited this sector’s productivity. Once this dis­
crimination ended, the improved access of smallholders to existing technolo­
gies and national markets stimulated immediate gains. If these institutions 
had to be newly built, the transition would have been substantially slower.
Nevertheless, the Zimbabwe experience highlights a number of important 
characteristics of a successful smallholder development strategy. It shows 
the complementary impact of a combined set of agricultural interventions. 
Maize production grew because available technologies increased the profita­
bility of this enterprise well above most competing crops. Production ex­
panded for the market, not simply when producer prices increased, but par­
ticularly when market access improved. The increase in farm-level prices 
corresponded with a reduction of input costs associated with improved input 
availability and the attainment of access to credit. Further, the structure of 
market institutions allowed the private sector, including farmers, to make 
investments which were complementary to those offered by the government.
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FOOD SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
In a paper leading off the 1986 Conference on Food Security on Southern 
Africa, Rukuni and Eicher (1987) explained that food security requires food 
availability as well as food access. This distinction is important in judging 
the gains Zimbabwe has achieved by tripling smallholder maize production. 
The country and the smallholder sector as a whole have clearly benefited 
from both the increase in smallholder productivity and the associated growth 
of national maize stocks. The nation’s food security has improved. Yet this 
analysis highlights the difference between increasing average per capita food 
supplies, or food stocks, and the more difficult task of improving the pro­
ductivity and consumption levels of those households facing the greatest food 
security risks.
The largest gains in production and largest contributions to national 
maize stocks were achieved by those smallholders facing the lowest risks of 
encountering consumption deficits. The food insecure have benefited from 
the expansion of support for smallholder agriculture. The widespread dis­
semination of hybrid maize seed has lifted these farmers’ yields. The rise 
in productivity of the larger producers has helped reduce local maize prices, 
particularly in drought years. The growth of smallholder maize production 
has also increased per capita retentions to the levels attained during the 
mid-1970s. The large maize stocks provide a basis for the more timely, and 
perhaps more generous, delivery of food aid. Yet, these gains remain small 
relative to the needs of farmers continuing to face food security risks.
The growth of smallholder maize production provides an example of the 
advances in smallholder production which can be achieved. To broaden these 
advances, future agricultural development strategies must increasingly focus 
on relaxing the constraints faced by different segments of the smallholder 
population. One of the most severe constraints facing the majority of 
smallholders situated in Zimbabwe’s semi-arid regions is the frequent inci­
dence of drought. While large national maize stocks offer one means to 
offset these risks, these are costly to maintain. The distribution of food aid 
is also an expensive undertaking. Additional investments in expanding mar­
ket infrastructure or agricultural credit will not necessarily benefit these 
farmers. Instead, they will require further improvement in low-cost agricul­
tural technologies, and most likely, the expansion of income-earning oppor­
tunities from sources other than crop production.
The poorer farmers in the high-potential zones require less input­
intensive technologies. These farmers can benefit from input recommenda­
tions which simply increase returns and productivity above current levels, 
rather than maximizing production returns. This implies the need to develop
L
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distinct low and high-input cost recommendations and place greater emphasis 
on improving crop management practices. Measures can also be taken to en­
courage complementary links between farm and non-farm enterprises.
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